Amigos
acabo de ver na CNN um comentario do Fareed Zakaria sobre o que ele chama Putinism(
nationalism, religion, social conservatism, state capitalism and government domination of the media)...
Muito interessante, pois confirma, se ele esta certo,
minha visão de que estamos vendo um ressurgimento do "fascismo" agora
falando russo. Veja que ele comenta o apoio dos partidos de extrema
direita na Europa (e do governo Hungaro) ao Putin, e eu adicionaria a
isto, o apoio que o Putin tem nas Sirias do Oriente Medio, e mais
proximo a nos, da Venezuela, Equador, Bolivia, Argentina, Cuba (para nao
falar de pindorama) no que chamo de "fascismo vermelho da America
Latina"
O artigo abaixo do Fareek no Washington Post é exatamente o que ele disse na CNN.
Tempos interessantes, nunca imaginei ver o fascismo de volta durante minha vida, mas......
abcs
The rise of Putinism
By Fareed Zakaria Opinion writer July 31
When
the Cold War ended, Hungary occupied a special place in the story of
the revolutions of 1989. It was one of the first countries in the Soviet
orbit to abandon communism and embrace liberal democracy. Today it is
again a trendsetter, becoming the first European country to denounce and
distance itself from liberal
democracy. It is adopting a new system and set of values that are best
exemplified by Vladimir Putin’s Russia but are finding echoes in other
countries as well.
In a major speech last weekend, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban explained that his country is determined to build a new political model — illiberal democracy. This caught my eye because, in 1997, I wrote an essay in Foreign Affairs using that same phrase to
describe a dangerous trend. Democratic governments, often popular, were
using their mandates to erode individual rights, the separation of
powers and the rule of law. But even I never imagined that a national
leader — from Europe no less — would use the term as a badge of honor.
“The
most popular topic in thinking today is trying to understand how
systems that are not Western, not liberal, not liberal democracies and
perhaps not even democracies can nevertheless make their nations
successful,” Orban said.
For him, the world changed fundamentally in 2008 with what he calls
“the great Western financial collapse.” Since then, he argues, American
power has been in decline and liberal values today embody “corruption,
sex and violence.” Western Europe has become a land of “freeloaders on
the backs of welfare systems.” The illiberal role models for the future,
he explains, are Russia, Turkey, China, Singapore and India.
Leaving
aside his odd list (India?), Orban’s actions over the past few years
demonstrate that his own role model has been Russia under Putin. Orban
has enacted and implemented in Hungary a version of what can best be
described as “Putinism.” To understand it, we need to go back to its
founder.
When he came to power in 2000,
Putin seemed a tough, smart, competent manager, someone who was
determined to bring stability to Russia — which was reeling from
internal chaos, economic stagnation and a default in 1998.
He sought to integrate Russia into the world and wanted good relations
with the West, asking Washington for Russian membership in the World
Trade Organization and even NATO. His administration had technocrats who were Western liberals, well versed in free markets and open trade.
Over
time, however, Putin established order in the country while presiding
over a booming economy as oil prices quadrupled under his watch. He
began creating a repressive system of political, economic and social
control to maintain his power. As he faced opposition, particularly in
the parliamentary elections of 2011,
Putin recognized that he needed more than just brute force to defeat
his opponents. He needed an ideology of power and began articulating one
in speeches, enacting legislation and using his office to convey
adherence to a set of values.
The crucial elements of Putinism are
nationalism,
religion, social conservatism, state capitalism and government
domination of the media. They are all, in some way or another, different
from and hostile to, modern Western values of individual rights,
tolerance, cosmopolitanism and internationalism. It would be a mistake
to believe that Putin’s ideology created his popularity — he was popular
before — but it sustains his popularity.
Orban
has followed in Putin’s footsteps, eroding judicial independence,
limiting individual rights, speaking in nationalist terms about ethnic
Hungarians and muzzling the press. The methods of control are often more
sophisticated than traditional censorship. Hungary recently announced
a 40 percent tax on
ad revenues that seems to particularly target the country’s only major
independent television network, which could result in its bankruptcy.
If
you look around the world, there are others who have embraced core
elements of Putinism. Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan has veered away from
his reformist agenda toward one that is more socially conservative,
Islamist and highly nationalistic. He, too, has used clever tricks to
cow the media into subservience. Many of Europe’s far-right leaders —
France’s Marine Le Pen, Geert Wilders of the Netherlands and even
Britain’s Nigel Farage — are openly admiring of Putin and what he stands
for.
The
success of Putinism will depend a great deal on the success of Putin
and Russia under him. If he triumphs in Ukraine, turning it into a
basket case that eventually comes begging to Moscow, he will look like a
winner. If, on the other hand, Ukraine succeeds outside of Russia’s
orbit and the Russian economy continues to weaken, Putin might find
himself presiding over a globally isolated Siberian petro-state.
Read more from Fareed Zakaria’s archive, follow him on Twitter or subscribe to his updates on Facebook.